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1THE ROLE OF THE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY1
Jens Rasmussen
Danish Atomic Energy Commission, Research Establishment Risø
Abstract: Human malfunctions in abnormal tasks are an important factor in low
probability events, but human behavior in higher level mental tasks cannot yet be
predicted. It is therefore important to verify the limits of use of existing methods of
reliability prediction.
THE PROBABILITY/SEVERITY RELATIONSHIP
The probability of an abnormal event can be assumed to be inversely proportional
to the related consequence to the system operation. This is in agreement with the
frequency/severity plot of injuries in American industry shown by Johnson
(1972) and is also reflected in the nuclear safety criterion suggested by Farmer
(1967). The importance of low probability events imposing severe risks on the
system has to be faced, if reliability prediction should be of any real value. In the
safety assessment of nuclear plants for instance, the look-out is for failure
probabilities in the range 10-5-10-7 per year or less. Neither the functional
analysis of the system to identify the relevant causes and consequences of faults
nor the probability analysis itself can cover all possible events. The analysis must
be based upon a number of assumptions and approximations, and there is a
danger that important, but low probability, fault modes are excluded from the
analysis. It should therefore be realized that a quantitative reliability figure only
constitutes a minor part of the result from the analysis. A very significant part of
the result is given implicitly in the assumptions and approximations. as they very
often identifies conditions which may be of low probability but vital to the total
reliability. Furthermore, they typically involve conditions, which are dealt with by
the plant personnel, and it is therefore important that the assumptions and
approximations underlying the analysis are interpreted and documented carefully
to facilitate their verifications during plant operation.
THE CAUSE / CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
The first important step of the analysis of a process system is a
cause/consequence evaluation aiming at an identification of the relevant fault
traces through the system. A fault tree analysis based upon typical component
faults may not identify low probability, but risky fault traces. A vital part of the
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2analysis will be to trace also the possible but improbable faults and combinations
of faults, from a postulated set of consequences. This in itself implies an interface
problem between the system and the analyst, as it demands a detailed knowledge
of the practical layout of the technical system and of the working conditions and
behavior of the plant personnel. The prime condition to be fulfilled by a reliable
analysis is of course that all relevant traces are identified. In a complex system
the analysis cannot cover all physically possible faults and their combinations,
and it is therefore important to have systematic heuristic methods to identify
relevant traces. Such a method should support the creative or inventive powers of
the analyst, and we have briefly considered the "morphological" method
suggested by Zwicky (1967), which may be a fruitful approach. Johnson (1972)
has recently published a comprehensive work on systematic evaluation of
accidents using a similar approach. Johnson traces the possible causes starting
from a rather high level of abstraction and controlling the tracing of faults
systematically though several levels of detail, such as:
"an accident is
- an unwanted transfer of energy,
- because of lack of barriers and/or controls,
- producing injury to persons, property or process
- preceded by sequences of planning and operational errors which failed to
adjust to changes in physical or human factors, and produced unsafe conditions
and/or unsafe acts,
- arising out of the risk in an activity,
- and interrupting or degrading the activity."
We find it very important to develop systematic methods for cause/consequence
tracing with tight coupling to appropriate models to facilitate the complete
analysis (Nielsen 1971).
A clear systematic approach to the identification of relevant fault traces
furthermore facilitates adequate documentation of the analyzed mechanisms
considerably. This documentation is a vita] part of the man-machine interface. A
trivial, but important condition of a reliable analysis is of course that it deals with
the system actually operating. The system, however, may be subject to changes.
Equipment can be modified and improved according to operational experience, as
well as working procedures and instructions will be changed-planned or
unnoticed. A considerable risk therefore exists that the conditions of plant
reliability will be unintentionally violated. To avoid this the analysis must be
documented in a systematic form, which can be readily interpreted and used by
the operational staff.
THE HUMAN FACTOR IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Our attention was directed towards the human element in the system by a
review (Rasmussen 68) of reported major incidents and accidents. Its purpose
3was to enable us to judge whether our methods for reliability evaluation also
included such cases - and we found they did not. Among the cases reviewed are
30 cases reported in USAEC Nuclear Safety Bulletin. In 70 - 80% of these cages,
the incidents were initiated from human mal-operation in the system.
Furthermore, the mal-operations did not take place during normal tasks, but
overwhelmingly during abnormal or special tasks under abnormal plant
conditions, such as modifications, repairs or cleaning and calibration operations;
typically operations which are difficult to predict and analyze, and therefore
normally covered by suitable assumptions in the analysis. This is quite
reasonable from the traditional reliability point of view, as this type of faults
normally account for a small fraction of the total number. In a British fault
record 8,000 cases from nuclear installations including trivial technical and
human faults, the human faults amount to only 10% of the total (Ablitt 1969).
But in our context it is most unfortunate that the source of severe incidents is
very likely found in a class of faults, which are normally excluded from the
analysis by proper assumptions. A few examples will illustrate this point of view.
The reliability of a system very often depends heavily upon an assumption of
mutual independence of fault mechanisms Physical sources of common mode
faults such as flooding by water, rupture by missiles or trucks, etc., may be
identified by a morphological search. But coupling due to people moving around
in the plant? If an abnormal condition in the plant, for instance due to a
technical fault in a subsystem, calls for manual intervention, there is a
probability that an operator misinterprets the situation and manipulates another
part of the system. The result is a coincidence of two faults, which are physically
independent and as such difficult to predict at an office desk, although it may be
likely to happen, judged from the actual working conditions. The problem is that
although it may be possible to predict the probability of operator failure to
execute the required function, it may be almost impossible to predict what he
does instead. In redundant systems the assumption of independence can lead to
extreme reliability figures - but the actual figure may likely be controlled by the
probability of a faulty repair - which is repeated in more units. Probability
modeling of a complex system is often simplified substantially if proper function
of equipment is assumed verified at certain intervals and after repair. This
assumption is vulnerable and sometimes unrealistic, partly because repair and
test in itself can be faulty, but also due to technical difficulties in testing the
equipment without putting it into operation. Furthermore, pressure of work
during plant shut down can be great to regain plant operation in due time to
avoid the operational consequences from process cool down or processes like
xenon poison in nuclear plants. Therefore, test and calibration procedures may
be postponed to the restart phase. This may be critical, as faults introduced
during repair and modification work may leave the plant in an abnormal state,
which is not covered by the protection of the normal safety system. Although
such periods are normally relatively short, they can in our experience contribute
4significantly to the total risk of the plant. In other words, in evaluating the
reliability of a system like process plants, the role of the human functions in the
system should be considered not only to include primary human functions in the
reliability analysis itself, but also to verify the assumptions of the analysis, as the
assumptions are ultimately administered by plant personnel.
PREDICTION OF HUMAN RELIABILITY
Several important approaches have been made towards the development of
methods for predicting human reliability. Such methods have recently been
reviewed by Meister (1972) and are the subject of other lectures of this meeting.
The basic assumptions of these methods are typically:
- The task is well defined and the procedure followed can formulated in detail,
- The procedure can be broken down into a sequence of behavioral units, i.e.
subtasks or task elements,
- Data on the reliability of the individual subtasks are available together with the
parameters characterizing the relevant task situations.
Typically these assumptions do not fit the work procedures found in process
plant environments. The work procedures may be known in detail under task
conditions, where the physical environment paces the man, and thus forces him
to use a known sequence of subtasks, as is the case in e. g. manual assembly
processes.
In modern automated process plants, however, the human function is typically
higher level mental data processing and decision making, and the human work
procedures are constrained by the physical environment to a much lesser degree.
Consequently, the normal practice is to try to control the work procedure in
critical tasks by work instructions which take into account the possible deviation
from normal working condition that have been identified during system design.
However, in the analysis of accidents it is frequently seen that such safe work
procedures have been operationally "improve" to fit the normal work situation in
a way that does not take account of the predicted risk.
In reliability assessment this tendency has to be faced in a realistic way. As
long as the prime cause to have the people in the plant is the human ability to
adapt to the operational needs of the plant and to improvise in all plant
conditions not foreseen by the system designer, it is not reasonable to expect
them to follow work procedures which are troublesome in the normal work, just
for the sake of conditions they possibly never meet.
The concluding remarks in reports investigating accidents, which are due to
inappropriate procedures, frequently prescribe "tighter administrative control" of
work instructions, A more realistic approach is the situational one, as advocated
by Rigby and Swain, who argue that a work situation can only be reliable if
properly fitted to normal variability of human behavior. Human actions due to
normal psychological mechanisms should not be classified as operator errors,
5even if they do lead to system faults. Rather the work situations have not been
designed in a way resulting in predictable procedures.
Unfortunately, very few studies have been made to describe the procedures
evolving in higher level mental tasks in real life working conditions and to relate
them to controlling factors in the work situation. Consequently we have recently
initiated such studies. We have examined mental procedures in control room
environment and in an electronic work shop, and the preliminary analysis has
identified features which we find illustrating in the present discussion,
We have found that the creativity and adaptability of man often result in the
evolution of several basically different mental procedures for the same type of
task, all capable of ending up with the same result. The procedures may differ in
several basic aspects. such as the amount of data or observations which are
needed; the complexity of the mental data processing which is implied; the depth
of functional knowledge regarding the system anatomy and function which is
used; and finally the time spent the task (Rasmussen and Jensen 1973). A fault
in an electronic system, for instance, may be located from a minimum number
observations if a careful deduction is used, based upon a detail knowledge of
system anatomy and internal functioning. However the fault may also be located
by a rapid sequence of observations or measurements and simple checks against
normal values in a diagram without considering the functioning of the system. In
this way different procedures can be available to a human operator for a specific
type of task, procedures which fit the different working conditions in which the
task is met. The choice between the different procedures depends upon the
performance criteria adopted by the man in the actual working situation. The
rapid stream of simple decisions may be valued in some cases, due to the low
cognitive strain implied, in other cases the complex reasoning may be chosen due
to informational economy. The important point is that the performance criterion
of the designer and the real life operator most probable: are different, and the
designer very likely will not predict the actual procedures used by trained
personnel, unless he is very familiar with the actual task conditions from studies
on site. A further prerequisite to be able to use the classical reliability methods
for evaluation of human behavior is the break down of the procedures used into a
sequence of typical and generally used units. This can be done for a task in
which the element of the sequence on the work steps are defined and cued by the
environment as for manual tasks in production. But again it is not the case for
higher level data processing tasks in plant environments . Newell and Simon
(1958) have argued that mental processes underlying human data processing
and decision making can be decomposed into a sequence of elementary units,
and as such simulated by a digital computer program. But in our experience this
is not the whole truth, and Dreyfus (1965) has criticized the assumption and
stressed the role of holistic, intuitive processing, which cannot be decomposed
into elementary units. Discussing the decisions of chess playing, he argues:
playing chess
6. . . may involve noticing that 'here something interesting seems to be going on',
'he looks weak over here' etc. Only after the player has zeroed in on an area does he
begin to count out, to test, what can be done from there.-
In other words the first, important step in the mental work sequence, the
identification of the task situation and the appropriate goal, may be based upon
holistic process, pattern recognition, intuition and "feelings", and based hereupon
a sequential processing may take place.
From our reviews of reported accidents we have found the identification of the
proper task in abnormal plant conditions to be very critical, and our conclusions
from preliminary analysis in control room environments tend to support the view
of Dreyfus.
The operator seems to have a "process feeling", some sort of internal dynamic
model of the environment, which all the time keeps him prepared for the normal
tasks to come. This means .that he may only be prepared to look for very little
information the actual time of a task, and it is not possible to predict whether the
information actually underlying his decisions is properly updated. Furthermore
the source of information chosen may be convenient sources during the normal
working condition, such , noise from the system, e. g. relay clicks, rather than
information planned by the designer to be task defining and therefore displayed
to the operator and considered in a prediction. Fundamentally this effect of the
"process-feeling" links the elements of a task sequence together and they cannot
be treated individually. A control room operator typically does not perform
isolated actions on well specified bits of information, he is an integrated part of a
dynamic situation. This causes difficulties which are hard to predict when
abnormal plant conditions suddenly demand the operator to switch to other
tasks and performance criteria. The reactions to abnormal plant conditions an
only be treated in the light of the normal working conditions prior to the event
and setting the process-feeling and thus the expectations of the operator. The
reactions can only be treated in isolation, if the man-machine interface can be
designed to break the routines of the operator and to set the initial conditions of
his data processing in a predictable way at the start of a task. It is worth noting
that the basic aspects of the procedures adopted by man for a task normally will
depend upon the frequency of the task. The very frequent tasks are met by
procedures based upon pattern recognition and trained, partly subconscious
routines; less frequent tasks by procedures based upon plans or instructions
whereas the unique, very infrequent task may call for improvisation and complex,
deductive reasoning related to understanding plant anatomy and functioning.
Again the frequency/risk relationship intrudes our problem. In a reasonably well
designed system an inverse relationship can be expected between the frequency
of an event calling for manual intervention and the risk implied in the event, and
again the frequent events are easier to predict and analyze, whereas the
infrequent, but critical events are of major importance to the system user. As
discussed above, the familiar tasks set the stage for the unexpected, new events
and consequently the operator tends to approach a new task by the most
7probable hypothesis, although most safety regulations tend to force the man to
consider first the hypothesis covering the most critical cause. To see how far we
can get in planning a man-machine interface that will cause personnel to adopt
predictable procedures it is very important to have methods for prediction of
human reliability verified by field tests and to have a clear identification of the
characteristics of those work procedures and working situations they can be used
to analyze, and to have more studies to identify the procedures evolving during
process plant operation under different typical working conditions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The methods of probabilistic reliability evaluation today are efficient tools
internally in the design offices for process plant equipment. To reach the state,
where the methods can be used to a quantitative evaluation of the reliability of a
complete operating process plant and an assessment of plant safety, it is
imperative to create a closer relation to the realities of process plant operation.
This implies an interdisciplinary cooperation between the fields of reliability
engineering, human factors engineering and plant operation, and a careful
verification of the methods including an explicit statement of the limits of their
appropriate use.
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